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Abstract 
Slippery Slope Arguments (SSAs) of the form if A, then C describe an initial proposal (A) and a 
predicted, undesirable consequence of this proposal (C) (e.g., “If cannabis is ever legalised, then 
eventually cocaine will be legalised too”). Despite SSAs being a common rhetorical device, there has 
been surprisingly little empirical research into their subjective evaluation and perception.  Here, we 
present evidence that SSAs are interpreted as a form of consequentialist argument, inviting inferences 
about the speaker’s (or writer’s) attitudes. Study 1 confirms the common intuition that a SSA is 
perceived to be an argument against the initial proposal (A), while Study 2 shows that the subjective 
strength of this inference relates to the subjective undesirability of the predicted consequences (C). 
Because arguments are rarely made out of context, Studies 3 and 4 examined how one important 
contextual factor, the speaker’s known beliefs, influence the perceived coherence, strength and 
persuasiveness of a SSA. Using an unobtrusive dependent variable (eye movements during reading) 
Study 3 showed that readers are sensitive to the internal coherence between a speaker’s beliefs and the 
implied meaning of their argument. Finally, Study 4 revealed that this degree of internal coherence 
influences the perceived strength and persuasiveness of the argument. Together, these data indicate 
that SSAs are treated as a form of negative consequentialist argument. People infer that the speaker of 
a SSA opposes the initial proposal; therefore SSAs are only perceived to be persuasive and 
conversationally relevant when the speaker’s attitudes match this inference.  
Key words: Slippery Slope; Argumentation; Inference; Conditional reasoning; Experimental 
Pragmatics  
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Slippery Slope Arguments imply opposition to change 
People frequently argue against relatively moderate proposals on the basis that their implementation 
will start a chain of events that ultimately leads to an undesirable outcome. For example, an anti-drug 
use campaigner might argue that legalising cannabis will put lawmakers on a slippery slope towards 
the legalisation of much harder drugs, like cocaine. These so-called Slippery Slope Arguments (SSAs) 
are common in everyday discourse and frequently used in political, legal and ethical debates (see 
Walton, 1992, for various examples). Despite being subjectively persuasive to some, this type of 
argument is often viewed as a logically fallacy (e.g., see Tindale, 2007 for a discussion), although, 
there is some evidence that SSAs may have a rational basis in Bayesian decision theory (Corner, Hahn 
& Oaksford, 2011; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007).  
The prototypical SSA takes the conditional form if antecedent (A), then consequent (C) and may 
make explicit reference to a ‘Slippery Slope’ (see 1), but often this metaphor is implicit (see 2).  
1. If we agree to air strikes against the enemy, [then] we will be on a slippery slope towards 
‘boots on the ground’.  
2. If voluntary euthanasia is ever legalised, [then] it will ultimately lead to the legalisation of 
involuntary euthanasia. 
These examples are of a form that Walton (2015) refers to as ‘compressed slippery slope arguments’ 
that jump from an initial proposal to the distal consequences, leaving the intermittent steps unstated. 
The content and subjective strength of these arguments can vary widely, but they share several 
common features (Rizzo & Whitman, 2003). In an initial effort to provide a definition of the SSA that 
is useful from a psychological perspective Corner et al. (2011) identified four distinct components: 
a. An initial proposal (A) 
b. An undesirable outcome (C) 
c. The belief that allowing (A) will lead to a re-evaluation of (C) in the future 
d. The rejection of (A) based on this belief 
The initial proposal is typically stated as a conditional antecedent (if A…) while the undesirable 
outcome is stated in the consequent clause (…then C). Belief in a SSA is based on the perceived 
likelihood that allowing (A) will raise the probability of (C) in the future. Therefore, like other types 
of thematic conditional, the degree of belief in a SSA is based on the subjective conditional 
probability of (C) given (A) (c.f., Evans & Over, 2004). Corner et al. (2011) demonstrated that the 
algorithmic level mechanism for establishing these degrees of belief relies on a process of category 
boundary re-appraisal, whereby classifying one item (e.g., cannabis) into a new category (e.g., ‘legal 
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drugs’) increases the likelihood of further items being classified in the same category (e.g., cocaine). 
A consequence of this mechanism is that the more similar the items at the top (e.g., cannabis) and 
bottom (e.g., cocaine) of the slippery slope, the stronger the argument is perceived to be.  From this 
perspective, example 3 (in which the ends of the slope are similar) should be perceived as a 
subjectively stronger argument than example 4 (in which the ends of the slope are dissimilar).  
3. If Class C drugs are legalised, then class B drugs will ultimately be legalised too.  
4. If Class C drugs are legalised, then automatic weapons will ultimately be legalised too.  
The final aspect of the definition by Corner et al. (2011) concerns the ultimate rhetorical purpose of a 
SSA, that is to imply that the initial proposal should be rejected. In this way, SSAs are similar to 
conditional dissuasions, in which an undesirable consequence is offered as a disincentive to act on the 
initial proposal (cf. Thompson, Evans & Handley, 2005). The proposed illocutionary function of 
SSAs is uncontroversial among theorists, regardless of whether this type of argument is viewed as a 
fallacy. However, there is currently no direct psychological evidence that people do actually infer the 
speaker’s or writer’s opposition to the initial proposal. This type of inference requires the recipient of 
a SSA to simultaneously reason from their own perspective but also from the perspective of the 
speaker (Thompson et al., 2005), a process that may be far from trivial in light of evidence 
demonstrating that even neurotypical adults can be fallible when it comes to mentally representing the 
basic beliefs, desires and intentions of others (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007).   
In this paper we address this gap in the literature by examining what the utterance of a SSA reveals to 
a recipient about the attitudes of the speaker. We propose that the SSA is treated as form of 
consequential, dissuasive argument that implies the speaker’s desire to avoid a proposed action (c.f., 
Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004; Thompson et al., 2005; Walton, 2015).  Using a set of twenty four novel 
SSAs we first present empirical evidence for a common intuition, namely that SSAs imply the 
speaker’s opposition to the initial proposal (A). In terms defined by Austin (1962), the illocutionary 
force of a SSA is to imply the speaker’s opposition to change, while the perlocutionary act of a SSA 
is to persuade the listener (or reader) to feel the same. Establishing empirically the extent to which 
SSAs achieve their illocutionary and perlocutionary goals will act as a foundation for future research. 
While this type of argument has generated much theoretical discussion in the fields of philosophy, 
ethics and law, empirical studies of its subjective perception and affect are scarce.   
After Study 1 provides the empirical foundation, Study 2 examines how readers use the decision 
theoretic characteristics of a SSA to evaluate the strength of the speaker’s opposition to change and 
the extent to which these arguments affect the beliefs of the recipient. Because this type of argument 
is rarely made out of context, Studies 3 and 4 examine how one important contextual factor, the 
speaker’s known beliefs, may influence the perceived coherence, strength and persuasiveness of a 
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SSA. Using an unobtrusive dependent variable (reading times measured using an eye tracker), Study 3 
examines whether readers spontaneously infer a speaker’s opposition to change during real time, 
online processing of a SSA. By varying the speaker’s explicitly stated beliefs (e.g., the speaker is 
described as opposing or supporting the initial proposal), this method allows us to assess the 
perceived degree of internal coherence and conversational relevance of a SSA with respect to the 
speaker’s beliefs and intentions. Finally, since the perlocutionary goal of a SSA is to persuade the 
recipient, Study 4 examines how the degree of coherence between the speaker’s intentions and the 
meaning implied by their argument influences the perceived strength and persuasiveness of a SSA.  
 
Study 1 
There is currently no direct psychological evidence that SSAs result in inferences about the attitudes 
of a speaker; however there is some evidence that other forms of conditional statement do imply that 
the speaker opposes an initial proposal. For example, conditional warnings (e.g., If you have another 
drink, you will miss your plane) and threats (e.g., If you turn up late again, I will fire you) are 
routinely identified as dissuasions against an initial proposal, based on the negative utility of their 
consequences (López-Rousseau & Ketelaar, 2006; Thompson et al., 2005; see also Evans, Neilens, 
Handley & Over, 2008). However, SSAs differ from threats and warnings because the initial proposal 
tends to describe the potential action of a third party, rather than an action of the hearer or reader. As a 
result, Corner et al. (2011) argue that the SSA can be better categorised as a form of negative 
consequentialist argument (also known as an ‘appeal to negative consequences’), expressed in the 
form of a consequential conditional (cf. Bonnefon, 2009; Bonnefon, Haigh & Stewart, 2013; 
Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004).  
Consequential conditionals are simply conditional statements (If A, then C) that describe the 
controllable action of a third party (A) and its valued consequences (C). When a consequential 
conditional has undesirable consequences (e.g., “If Didier takes up this new job, he will be paid less 
and be less happy”) it is rational to infer that the antecedent action will not be taken (i.e., that Didier 
will not take up the job). As perceived undesirability of the predicted consequence increases, so does 
the strength of this inference (Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004). Therefore, if somebody utters a conditional 
argument that outlines the undesirable consequences of an initial proposal, it is rational, from this 
perspective, to infer that they are arguing against the initial proposal. The more undesirable the 
predicted consequences, the stronger this inference should be. 
In Study 1 we present evidence that people treat SSAs as a form of negative consequentialist 
argument and infer that the speaker is arguing for the initial proposal to be rejected. We constructed 
twenty four SSAs differing in lexical and semantic content, but sharing the same syntactic and 
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pragmatic features (the full list of arguments can be found in Appendix 1). A limitation of previous 
SSA studies is that they rely on data from a limited number of examples and are therefore at risk of 
committing the ‘language as fixed effect fallacy’ (Clark, 1973). Participants were presented with the 
arguments and asked to write down, in their own words, what they could infer about the speakers 
attitudes towards the topic described in the antecedent (‘if…’) clause (see Figure 1 for an example of 
this task).  
 
Figure 1: Example of a SSA and question used in Study 1.  
Jayne and Carly were discussing their feelings about euthanasia. Carly argued that “If voluntary 
euthanasia is ever legalised, it will ultimately lead to the legalisation of involuntary euthanasia”. 
From this statement, what can you infer about Carly’s attitudes towards voluntary 
euthanasia? 
 
Method 
Twenty three participants (11 females, mean age 28.4 years) were recruited from an online participant 
pool (www.prolificacademic.co.uk). They completed the task online in their own time and location. 
All participants were native English speakers and did not take part in the other studies presented 
below. They were each paid £3.50.  
Study 1 was conducted online using Qualtrics. Each participant was presented with the 24 SSAs. For 
each argument they were asked to write down what they could infer about the speakers attitude 
towards the topic described in the antecedent clause (with a limit of 200 characters). If participants 
felt that nothing could be inferred from an argument, they were instructed to reply by typing 
‘nothing’. These arguments were interspersed with 24 filler arguments that had positive consequences 
(e.g., If the minimum wage is raised, then living standards will eventually improve). Each participant 
saw 48 arguments (24 SSAs plus 24 filler items) presented in a unique random order.  
 
Results & Discussion  
 
Responses to each item were categorised according to the type of inference that was generated. 
Specifically, each response was coded into one of the following four categories:  
 
a) The participant infers that the speaker opposes action A  
b) The participant infers that the speaker supports action A  
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c) The participant explicitly states that ‘nothing’ can be inferred from the argument 
d) The participant provides an invalid response by paraphrasing the argument (without making any 
inference), or by providing an irrelevant answer  
 
Responses were categorised by the first author. They were also independently categorised by a second 
coder who was not otherwise involved with this research. There was a very high level of agreement 
between the two coders (κ = .85, p<.001). On average, participants inferred that the speaker was 
arguing against the action described in the antecedent clause for 76.8% of the SSAs. Example 
verbatim responses to the SSA presented in Figure 1 are provided below: 
 
Participant 2: “Carly disagrees with voluntary euthanasia” 
Participant 3: “Carly does not think voluntary euthanasia should be legalised, as it could lead to 
murder.” 
Participant 16: “Carly thinks the risks associated with the escalation of the laws is not worth 
legalising voluntary euthanasia.” [sic] 
Participant 19: “Carly opposes voluntary euthanasia.” 
 
The remaining responses were split between the other three categories. Some responses directly stated 
that nothing could be inferred (6.3%), while a minority of responses indicated that the speaker was 
actually in favour of the antecedent action (0.5%). All other responses (16.3%) were coded as invalid 
because the participant simply paraphrased the argument without making any inference, or provided 
an irrelevant answer. These data confirm the common intuition that SSAs imply the speaker’s desire 
to avoid the initial proposal. Participants treated SSAs as a form of negative consequentialist 
argument with decision theoretic features. Given that SSAs, by definition, predict a negative outcome 
(C) they imply that the speaker is against any action (A) that might see this outcome realised.  
  
 
Study 2 
An individual that produces a SSA could choose to highlight any number of undesirable consequences 
that differ in their severity, but they must consciously choose just one. For example, a speaker could 
choose to argue that the legalisation of Class C drugs in the UK could ultimately lead to the 
legalisation of Class B drugs (a moderately undesirable consequence) or to the legalisation of Class A 
drugs (a very undesirable consequence).  Therefore the recipient may use the subjective severity of 
the chosen consequence as a proxy to infer the strength of the speaker’s opposition to the initial 
proposal. Indeed, if SSAs are treated as a form of negative consequentialist argument, then the extent 
to which a speaker is seen to oppose the initial proposal (A) should be related to the severity of its 
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predicted undesirable consequences (C) (Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004). To test this prediction we 
presented participants with the same 24 SSAs used in Study 1 and asked them to rate i) the 
undesirability of the predicted consequence for each argument, and ii) the degree to which each 
argument implied that the initial proposal should be rejected. We predict that the more undesirable 
these predicted consequences, the more that the speaker will be seen to be arguing against the initial 
proposal.  
 
A secondary aim was to assess the extent to which a SSA influences the perceptions of a reader. A 
SSA can only be effective if it causes the recipient to believe that the initial proposal will actually 
raise the probability of the undesirable outcome. We therefore measured the prior subjective 
probability of the 24 undesirable events described in the consequent clauses of our SSAs (C) and also 
the subjective conditional probability of these consequences occurring given that the initial proposal 
also occurs. If SSAs successfully raise the subjective probability of an undesirable event, then the 
subjective conditional probability of (C) given (A) should be higher than the prior subjective 
probability of (C).   
 
Method 
 
We collected subjective ratings of five variables associated with the same 24 SSAs used in Study 1: 
 
i) The prior subjective probability of (A)  
ii) The prior subjective probability of (C) 
iii) The subjective conditional probability of (C) given (A)  
iv) The subjective undesirability of (C) (high scores equal greater undesirability) 
v) The extent to which the argument implies that the initial proposal (A) should be rejected 
(high scores mean that rejection is strongly implied)  
 
Ratings were provided on a 0-100 scale (see Appendix 1 for the full list of arguments and their mean 
ratings). Probability ratings were converted to a 0-1 scale for analysis purposes. 
 
Forty five psychology students from the University of Manchester (42 females, mean age 19.2 years) 
provided five ratings for each of the 24 arguments. The task was administered online using Qualtrics. 
Participants completed the task in their own time and location. Each participant received partial 
course credit. All were native English speakers and none took part in the other three studies. The five 
questions were presented concurrently, immediately below each argument. Each participant saw the 
24 arguments in a different random order.  
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Results & Discussion 
 
The t-tests reported below treat subjects (t1) and items (t2) as random factors. In Studies 2, 3 and 4 the 
by-subjects analysis allows us to assess whether our results can be generalised beyond the specific 
sample of participants recruited for this study, while the by-items analysis allows us to assess whether 
our results can be generalised beyond the specific arguments used in this study (c.f., Clark, 1973).  
 
Ratings indicated that the arguments were perceived to have highly undesirable outcomes (mean = 
81.6) and strongly implied that the argument was against the initial proposal (mean = 77.6). There was 
a strong positive relationship between these two variables (r = .847, p<.001). The more undesirable 
the predicted outcome, the more the argument implied that the antecedent action should be rejected. 
The conditional probability of (C) given (A) was greater than the prior probability of (C) (0.25 vs. 
0.18; t1(44) = 7.7, p = <.001, d = 1.2 t2(23) = 4.3, p = <.001, d = .92) indicating that the arguments 
successfully raised the perceived probability of the consequent event (C). However, even though the 
argument raised the subjective probability of C from 0.18 to 0.25, the perceived likelihood of this 
event was still low in absolute terms (0.25). In contrast, the message implied by the argument was 
strongly accepted. This pattern of results may be explained by the balance of utilities between the 
initial proposal of a SSA and its predicted consequences. The formulation of a SSA applied by Corner 
et al. (2011; see also Evans et al., 2008) treats the evaluation of a SSA as a cost-benefit analysis, 
weighing up the benefit of the proposed action against the cost of the predicted consequences. For 
most SSAs the benefits of the initial proposal are relatively less than the costs of the predicted 
consequence. If taking the antecedent action leads to even a small increase in the likelihood of C, then 
the benefit of taking this action may not be worth raising the probability of its possible consequences. 
This could explain why the speaker’s implied opposition to action A was perceived so clearly by our 
participants.  
 
These data suggest that SSAs are an effective rhetorical device; they increase the perceived likelihood 
of an undesirable event and strongly imply that the speaker wants the initial proposal to be rejected. 
The more undesirable the predicted consequence of the initial proposal, the more the speaker was seen 
to be arguing for the rejection of this proposal. This is consistent with the notion that SSAs are a form 
of negative consequentialist argument. These characteristics were shared by a variety of SSAs that 
differed in semantic content, therefore our results can be generalised beyond the specific arguments 
used in this study (c.f., Clark, 1973; Judd, Westfall & Kenny, 2012).  
 
Study 3 
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Thompson et al. (2005) argued that the evaluation of a conditional persuasion or dissuasion requires 
the recipient to reason from two independent perspectives. Specifically, an argument can be evaluated 
from the speaker’s perspective (i.e., to decode their implied message) but also from the recipient’s 
own perspective (i.e., to evaluate how convinced they are).  The purpose of Study 3 is to determine 
whether people spontaneously track the beliefs and intentions of the speaker. As shown by Studies 1 
and 2, the default interpretation of a SSA is that the speaker opposes the initial proposal; therefore, if 
people spontaneously adopt this perspective, SSAs should only be perceived to be congruent when the 
speaker’s attitudes permit this interpretation.  
To test this prediction we tracked eye movements as participants read SSAs embedded in vignettes. 
This method has been employed previously to examine how readers make rational inferences about 
the motivations and intentions of others (e.g., Haigh, Ferguson & Stewart, 2014; Haigh & Bonnefon, 
2015a; Haigh & Bonnefon, 2015b; Stewart, Haigh & Ferguson, 2013). Indeed, there is a large 
literature in discourse psychology exploring the extent to which readers monitor and evaluate the 
goals (Huitema, Dopkins, Klin & Myers, 1993), beliefs (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993), emotions 
(Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992) and abilities (Stewart, Kidd & Haigh, 2009) of a 
protagonist. This type of study commonly employs the contradiction paradigm, whereby participants 
read vignettes describing characters that act or speak in a way that contradicts their stated (or inferred) 
beliefs, desires or abilities. The effect this contradiction has on the processing is typically measured 
using an unobtrusive dependent variable, such as reading time to a critical region of text. For example, 
Albrecht and O’Brien (1993) found a reading time penalty when a vegetarian character ordered a 
hamburger, Huitema et al. (1993) found a similar penalty when a character who wanted to swim and 
sunbathe subsequently booked a flight to Alaska, while Haigh and Bonnefon (2015a) reported a 
penalty when a character avoided ordering the oysters that would make her happy. 
In Study 3 we employed the contradiction paradigm, and used eye tracking to record fixation times to 
the antecedent and consequent clauses of a SSA. This paradigm allows us to examine the mental 
representation, or situation model (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), that readers build as they process a 
SSA (e.g., that the speaker opposes action A). If this mental representation matches what is already 
known about the beliefs and attitudes of the speaker, then the SSA should be read quickly and 
fluently. In contrast, if the representation of a SSA mismatches the beliefs and attitudes of the speaker, 
then the SSA should result in relative disruption to normal, fluent reading. Such an effect will tell us 
two things a) that readers make a spontaneous inference from a SSA about the speaker’s attitudes, and 
b) that this inference is rapidly cross referenced with the speaker’s known beliefs, to assess its 
conversational relevance and the speaker’s internal coherence. 
Participants were presented with vignettes that described fictional characters uttering the 24 SSAs 
used in Studies 1 and 2. Prior context of each vignette was manipulated so that the stated beliefs of the 
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character asserting the SSA were either Consistent with an argument against the initial proposal (A), 
Inconsistent with an argument against the initial proposal (A) or Neutral (unknown attitude towards 
the initial proposal) (see Figure 2 for an example of the three conditions and Appendix 2 for full list of 
experimental items).  
Figure 2: Example vignette used in Study 3. Each vignette was presented in one of three contexts. 
The SSA is highlighted in bold and the two analysis regions are separated by vertical bars. 
Introduction  Jayne and Carly were discussing their feelings about euthanasia. 
  
a) Consistent context Carly was strongly against it becoming legal in the UK. 
b) Inconsistent context Carly was strongly in favour of it becoming legal in the UK. 
c) Neutral context Carly had recently heard that it could become legal in the UK. 
  
Antecedent (A) She argued that |“If voluntary euthanasia is ever legalised,| 
Consequent (C) |it will ultimately lead to the legalisation of involuntary euthanasia”.| 
Final sentence They were both engrossed by a live television debate on the subject. 
 
It is predicted that the assertion of a SSA will only be perceived as conversationally relevant when the 
speaker’s attitudes permit the default interpretation of a SSA (i.e., opposition to the initial proposal). 
As a result, the assertion of a SSA should be pragmatically acceptable to readers when the speaker is 
known to oppose the initial proposal or has unknown attitudes toward the initial proposal (Consistent 
and Neutral conditions), as neither of these attitudes contradict the implied opposition to this proposal. 
However, the SSA should not be pragmatically acceptable when the speaker is known to support the 
initial proposal (Inconsistent condition) as this supportive attitude contradicts the default 
interpretation of a SSA. This context manipulation should result in the same arguments being read 
quickly and fluently in the Consistent and Neutral conditions, but with relative disruption in the 
Inconsistent condition, as readers perceive an apparent contradiction.  
We examined how each of these contexts influenced the processing of SSAs. Specifically, we 
measured how fluently readers were able to process the antecedent (if A…) and consequent clauses 
(…then C) in each of the three experimental conditions. We expect any effects of context to first 
emerge as the consequent clause is read, as this region of text is the earliest point at which the 
utterance can be identified as a SSA.  
 
 
 
Method 
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Participants 
Twenty four native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision completed the 
experiment (21 females, mean age 19 years). Three additional participants did not complete the 
experiment and their data were excluded. Participants were students from Northumbria University and 
did not take part in the other three studies. Each received £5 cash. 
Design & Materials  
Experimental items were vignettes describing a discussion between two fictional characters. In each 
item a character was described as either being against an initial proposal (Consistent condition) or in 
favour of this proposal (Inconsistent condition). A third, Neutral condition provided no information 
about the character’s attitudes (see Figure 2). In the following sentence the character utters a SSA of 
the form if A, then C. Participants were exposed to each of the three conditions in a Latin Squared 
repeated measures design. 
Twenty four SSAs were constructed, and each was embedded in vignettes corresponding to the 
Consistent, Inconsistent and Neutral conditions. The resulting 72 vignettes were four sentences in 
length (see Appendix 2 for full list of items). Sentence one introduced two characters. Sentence two 
was manipulated, with the protagonist described as being either for or against a given proposal (A). In 
the Neutral condition, no information was given about their attitude towards the proposal. In sentence 
three, the protagonist uttered a SSA of the form if A, then C. Sentence four provided a continuation of 
the narrative. Within each scenario, sentences one, three and four were identical across conditions.  
One version of each scenario was placed into one of three Latin Squared presentation lists. Eight 
participants were assigned to each list. Each participant read 24 experimental items plus an additional 
24 filler items from an unrelated experiment. None of the filler items contained conditionals or 
arguments. The 48 items were presented in a different random order to each participant. 
Comprehension questions followed half of the items and were solved with a mean accuracy of 87%.  
Procedure  
Participants read the vignettes silently for comprehension. Eye movements were recorded using an 
Eyelink 1000 in desktop mount configuration. Viewing was binocular and recordings were sampled 
from the right eye at 1000Hz. Vignettes were presented in size 20 Arial font on a CRT monitor 80cm 
from the participants’ eyes. The head was stabilised using a chin rest. 
The eye tracker was calibrated using nine fixation points. Each trial began with a gaze trigger. 
Fixation on the gaze trigger caused the vignette to appear. After reading a vignette participants 
pressed a button on a handheld controller to advance either to a question or the next trial.  
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Analysis 
We analysed reading times to the antecedent clause of the argument (if A…) and to the consequent 
clause of the argument (then C…) (see Figure 2). These analysis regions were lexically identical 
within items across the three conditions. Fixations <80ms were pooled with adjacent fixations, while 
fixations <40ms were excluded if they were not within three characters of another fixation. Fixations 
>1200ms were truncated to 1200ms.  
The measure chosen to index the speed and fluency of reading was Regression Path reading time. This 
measure records the summed duration of fixations (in milliseconds), from when the eyes first enter a 
region of text to when the eyes first exit that region to the right. This measure is commonly described 
as the time taken to go past a region of text.  
Analyses were conducted using one way repeated measures ANOVAs with subjects (F1) and items 
(F2) as random factors. Significant effects were further analysed using planned comparisons. 
Because there were three planned comparisons following each ANOVA the Bonferroni corrected α 
was adjusted from .05 to .017.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
Figure 3: Mean Regression Path reading time in milliseconds to the antecedent and consequent 
clauses of our SSAs (means averaged over participants, error bars represent standard error of the 
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mean). Prior context was manipulated to be either Consistent, Neutral or Inconsistent with the 
assertion of a SSA.  
 
 
Figure 3 shows the mean reading time (in milliseconds) averaged across participants for each analysis 
region and condition. ANOVA revealed no effect of context on Regression Path reading times to the 
antecedent region (both Fs <1). However, an effect did emerge as the consequent clause was first 
encountered (F1(2,46) = 7.3, p=.002, ηp
2 = .242; F2(2,46) = 4.8, p=.013, ηp
2 = .172). Planned 
comparisons reveal that it took more time to initially go past the consequent region following the 
Inconsistent context than following the Consistent (2243 ms vs. 1888 ms; F1 (1,23) = 8.5, p=.008; F2 
(1,23) = 5.8, p=.025) or Neutral contexts (2243 ms vs. 1857 ms; F1 (1,23) = 10.1, p=.004; F2 (1,23) = 
5.9, p=.023). There was no difference in Regression Path time to this region between the Consistent 
and Neutral contexts (1888 ms. vs 1857 ms; both Fs <1).  
The earliest point at which an argument can be identified as a SSA is as the consequent clause is 
processed (because a negative consequence is a fundamental characteristic of SSAs). This region of 
text is where the effects of our manipulation first emerged. Regression Path reading times reveal how 
long it takes a reader to move past a region of text after first entering it. This measure revealed that 
initial processing of the consequent clause progressed equally quickly in contexts where the speaker 
was portrayed as being against the initial proposal (Consistent condition) and in contexts where 
SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS 
 
15 
 
nothing was known about the speaker’s attitudes (Neutral condition). Because these conditions did not 
contain information that contradicted the default interpretation of a SSA, the arguments were 
seemingly perceived to be congruent. However, when the speaker’s stated attitudes were in 
contradiction to this default SSA inference (Inconsistent condition), there was relative disruption to 
normal, fluent reading. These results indicate that readers spontaneously adopted the speaker’s 
perspective and inferred that their SSA opposed action A. As a result, the assertion of a SSA was only 
perceived as conversationally relevant when the speaker’s attitudes did not contradict this inference. 
 
Study 4 
The reading time data in Study 3 provide evidence that processing of a SSA is influenced by what the 
reader knows about the attitudes and beliefs of the speaker (i.e., a SSA is relatively difficult to process 
when the speaker is known to support the initial proposal). Finding that a processing cost arises when 
a character behaves inconsistently with their beliefs and desires is not new (e.g., Albrecht & O’Brien, 
1993; Huitema et al., 1993). However, finding such a cost during the processing of SSAs is revealing, 
as it suggests that readers are sensitive to the internal coherence between a speaker’s beliefs and the 
meaning implied by a SSA.  
The eye-tracking data in Study 3 show that readers found it easy to process a SSA when the argument 
did not contradict the speaker’s belief states, but relatively difficult when the inferred meaning of the 
argument contradicted these beliefs. The purpose of Study 4 is threefold. First, is to confirm that 
differences in the eye movement record were indeed due to the perceived degree of coherence 
between the speaker’s beliefs and the assertion of a SSA. Second, is to confirm that any such 
differences arose due to participants inferring that the SSA implies opposition to the initial proposal 
(A). Finally, we examined the extent to which our congruency manipulation influenced overall 
persuasiveness of the argument from the recipient’s perspective.  This final aim is crucial. While 
Study 3 shows that people spontaneously infer the message communicated by the speaker (the 
illocutionary force), it tells us nothing about how the message is evaluated from the reader’s own 
perspective (the perlocutionary act). Investigating how people understand the intentions behind the 
meanings of utterances is a central issue in the field of experimental pragmatics (Noveck & Reboul, 
2008).  
 
We asked participants to rate each of our 24 SSAs in each of the three contexts used in Study 3 (i.e., 
Consistent, Inconsistent, and Neutral). These ratings measured (a) the extent to which the argument is 
consistent with the speaker’s beliefs, (b) the extent to which the producer opposes the initial proposal, 
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and (c) the extent to which the producer makes a persuasive argument. If our eye-tracking results arise 
from the fact that readers are sensitive to incoherence between what the producer believes and what 
they imply through their SSA, then we would expect to find a difference across the contexts for a 
measures of perceived coherence and perceived opposition to action (A). The third measure will give 
an insight into the extent to which a SSA is more (or less) persuasive as a function of its congruence 
with the speaker’s beliefs. Given that the rhetorical function of SSAs is to persuade, this is a key 
issue. Objectively, a SSA should have the same level of persuasiveness regardless of the belief states 
of the person producing it. However, it is possible that the congruence between the speaker’s beliefs 
and the argument they make may influence how persuasive the argument is perceived to be (i.e., 
arguments may be more persuasive when the speaker is known to believe what they imply).  
Method 
Participants 
Forty five psychology students from Northumbria University completed the experiment (36 females, 
mean age 19.6 years). All were fluent English speakers and did not take part in the other three studies.  
Each participant received partial course credit.  
Design & Materials 
Participants were presented with the same materials used in Study 3 (See Figure 2). The 24 SSAs 
were embedded in vignettes and presented in one of three contexts (Consistent, Inconsistent and 
Neutral). The dependent variables for this experiment were subjective agreement ratings to three 
statements:  
i) The argument is consistent with the speaker’s beliefs 
ii) The speaker opposes [action A] 
iii) The speaker makes a persuasive argument 
For each item the three statements were each rated on an 11 point Likert scale anchored at -5 
(Strongly Disagree), 0 (Neither Agree nor Disagree) and +5 (Strongly Agree).  
 
 
Procedure  
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The study was administered online using Qualtrics and participants completed the task in their own 
time and location. One version of each scenario was placed into one of three Latin Squared 
presentation lists. Fifteen participants were randomly assigned to each list. The 24 items were 
presented in a different random order to each participant. The vignettes were each presented on a 
separate page with the three questions presented concurrently, immediately below each vignette. 
Results & Discussion  
Two sets of analyses were conducted for each question. We first conducted one-sample t-tests to 
determine whether agreement ratings in each condition differed from zero (because this value was 
labelled as ‘Neither Agree nor Disagree’ on the Likert scale). To examine relative differences in 
agreement between the three conditions we then conducted one way repeated measures ANOVAs, 
followed up by planned comparisons. The mean level of agreement in each condition to each of the 
three questions can be seen in Figure 4, while the relevant inferential statistics can be found in Table 
1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean agreement ratings to each of the three statements used in Study 4. Means are 
averaged over participants and error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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4a) The argument is consistent with the speaker’s beliefs 
 
4b) The speaker opposes [action A] 
 
4c) The speaker makes a persuasive argument 
 
 
 
Table 1: Inferential statistics for Study 4. One sample t-tests determine whether the agreement ratings in each condition differed from zero. 
ANOVAs and planned comparisons tested for relative differences in agreement between the three conditions, by subjects (F1) and by items (F2).  
 One sample t-test ANOVA Planned comparisons1 
 Consistent Inconsistent Neutral  Consistent vs. Neutral Consistent vs. Inconsistent Neutral vs. Inconsistent 
 
1) The argument is 
consistent with the 
speaker’s beliefs 
 
 
t(44) =12.67, 
p<.001 
 
t(44) = 2.21, 
p=.032 
 
t(44) = 7.88, 
p<.001 
 
F1(2,88) = 63.7, p<.001, ηp2 = .591;  
F2(2, 46) = 86.2, p<.001, ηp2 = .789 
 
F1 (1, 44) = 38.96, p<.001;  
F2 (1, 23) = 67.6, p<.001 
 
F1 (1, 44) = 81.6, p<.001;  
F2 (1, 23) = 121.59, p<.001 
 
F1 (1, 44) = 47.7, p <.001;  
F2 (1, 23) = 52.98, p<.001 
2) The speaker 
opposes [action A] 
 
 
t(44) =17.93, 
p<.001 
t(44) = .806, 
p=.425 
t(44) =13.82, 
p<.001 
F1(2, 88) = 76.3, p<.001, ηp2 = .634;  
F2(2, 46) = 95.1, p<.001, ηp2 = .805 
F1 (1, 44) = 30.1, p<.001; 
F2 (1, 23) = 15.4, p=.001 
F1 (1, 44) = 90.8, p<.001; 
F2 (1, 23) = 134.6, p<.001 
F1 (1, 44) = 68.6, p<.001; 
F2 (1, 23) = 100.1, p<.001 
3) The speaker 
makes a persuasive 
argument 
 
t(44) = .023, 
p=.982 
t(44) = 4.42, 
p<.001 
t(44) = 1.61, 
p=.115 
F1(2, 88) = 21.3, p<.001, ηp2 = .326;  
F2(2, 46) = 13.7, p<.001, ηp2 = .374 
F1 (1, 44) = 6.2, p=.017;  
F2 (1, 23) = 4.1, p=.056 
F1 (1, 44) = 35.1, p<.001; 
F2 (1, 23) = 24.6, p<.001 
F1 (1, 44) = 17.7, p<.001; 
F2 (1, 23) = 10.4, p=.004 
1The Bonferroni corrected α for the planned comparisons was .017 
 
In Study 4 we examined the extent to which participants were sensitive to (a) the extent to which a 
SSA is consistent with the producer’s beliefs, (b) the extent to which the producer opposes the initial 
proposal, and (c) the extent to which the producer makes a persuasive argument. The final question is 
key, as the goal of a SSA is to persuade.  
For the first statement rated by participants (i.e., ‘The argument is consistent with the speaker’s 
beliefs’) the data revealed a high degree of perceived internal cohesion in the Consistent condition. 
Participants also agreed (but to a lesser extent) that there was internal cohesion in the Neutral 
condition. In other words, neither of these contexts was inconsistent with the assertion of SSA. In the 
Inconsistent condition, participants did not perceive any internal cohesion between the argument and 
the speaker’s beliefs. These data help us to explain the eye tracking results from Study 3. The SSA in 
the Consistent and Neutral conditions was read quickly and fluently because readers perceive no 
inconsistency between the speaker’s attitudes and their subsequent argument. In contrast, the relative 
slowdown to reading times in the Inconsistent condition can be explained by a perceived incoherence 
between the speaker’s attitudes and the meaning implied by their SSA.  
The second statement rated by participants (i.e., ‘The speaker opposes [action A]’) allows us to 
determine whether the perceived degree of internal cohesion between context and the SSA results 
from an inference about the speaker’s opposition to the initial proposal. In the Consistent condition 
participants agreed that the speaker opposes the antecedent action (A). This is because the context 
explicitly states that this is the case (and because the SSA separately implies that this is the case). 
Agreement was also strong in the Neutral condition (but to a slightly lesser extent); this is because 
participants had to base their rating only on what could be inferred from the SSA. In the Inconsistent 
condition, participants neither agreed nor disagreed that the speaker opposed action (A). This is 
because prior context stated that the speaker supported action (A) whereas the SSA implied that they 
opposed action (A). These conflicting pieces of information made the speaker’s beliefs unclear to 
participants.  The pattern of data suggests that perceived cohesion between the speaker’s beliefs and 
their subsequent argument occurred because SSAs trigger people to infer that the speaker is against 
the antecedent action (A).  
Ratings to the third statement presented participants measured the extent to which the speaker makes a 
persuasive argument. Since the ultimate rhetorical purpose of a SSA is to persuade other people, the 
response to this question allows us to determine whether the perceived internal coherence between the 
speaker’s attitudes and the meaning implied by their SSA influences how persuasive the argument is 
seen to be. The first finding of note is that, on average, participants did not find the SSAs used in our 
study to be particularly persuasive (i.e., there was no consistent agreement that arguments were 
persuasive in any of the three conditions). This may have been because people were generally 
indifferent to the arguments or because the arguments split opinion (with positive ratings cancelling 
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out negative ratings).  However, there were interesting differences between the three conditions. SSAs 
were seen as being relatively less persuasive when their implied meaning was Inconsistent with the 
speaker’s attitudes (relative to when the speaker’s beliefs were consistent or unknown). This suggests 
that SSAs are perceived to be less persuasive when the meaning implied by the argument is 
contradicted by the speaker’s stated beliefs; as the degree of coherence decreased so did the degree of 
persuasiveness.  
 
General Discussion  
The four studies presented above indicate that SSAs of the form if A, then C are treated as a form of 
negative consequentialist argument, resulting in inferences about the speaker’s (or writer’s) attitudes. 
Using a set of 24 novel SSAs we first confirmed the common intuition that an individual who utters a 
SSA is seen to be arguing against the initial proposal (Study 1). We then found that the subjective 
strength of this inference is strongly related to the undesirability of the predicted consequences (Study 
2). Studies 3 and 4 then looked at the impact of an important contextual variable on the perception of 
a SSA - namely the speaker’s known beliefs. Eye movement data indicated that readers spontaneously 
adopted the speaker’s perspective, with the arguments only perceived as congruent when the 
speaker’s personal beliefs permitted opposition to the initial proposal (Study 3). Finally, Study 4 
showed that the degree of internal coherence between what the speaker believes and what they imply 
influences the perceived strength of their argument.  
Despite SSAs being a common rhetorical device in everyday discourse, there has been surprisingly 
little empirical research into their subjective evaluation and perception. As outlined in the 
Introduction, it has been argued that SSAs have four distinct components (Corner, et al., 2011). 
Previous research has identified an algorithmic mechanism for establishing degrees of belief in an 
argument (Corner, et al., 2011; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), thus advancing our understanding of the 
third defining characteristic (“The belief that allowing (A) will lead to a re-evaluation of (C) in the 
future”). In this paper we focused on the pragmatic implications of the fourth defining characteristic 
(“The rejection of (A) based on this belief”).  
Since SSAs imply that the initial proposal should be rejected, we predicted that the assertion of such 
an argument would lead to inferences about the attitudes of the person making the argument. Because 
SSAs fit the definition of a consequentialist argument, these inferences should be informed by the 
subjective utility of the consequent clause (Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004). When the predicted 
consequence of a consequentialist argument is negative, it is rational, in a decision theoretic sense, to 
assume that the speaker is against the initial proposal. This is what we found in Studies 1 and 2. 
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Participants strongly inferred that the speaker opposed the initial action and the strength of this 
inference correlated with the subjective undesirability of the predicted consequences.  
Inferring the speaker’s opposition to a given action requires the recipient of a SSA to attribute 
motivations and intentions to the speaker. There is a growing body of evidence that even neurotypical 
adults are susceptible to making errors when attributing mental states to other people (e.g., Birch & 
Bloom, 2007). The data presented above indicate that SSAs communicate a very clear message about 
the speaker’s mental states.  The extent to which this message was conveyed correlated very strongly 
with the subjective undesirability of the proposed consequence. The more undesirable the proposed 
outcome, the more the argument implied that the initial proposal should be rejected. The recipient of a 
SSA can therefore infer much about the speaker’s attitudes from just two simple cues; consequent 
valence and severity. A negatively valenced consequent leads the recipient to infer that the speaker 
opposes the initial proposal, while the severity of this consequent indicates the speaker’s degree of 
opposition. These subjective cues may allow a recipient to attribute mental states to the speaker using 
folk understandings of human motivation, rather than reasoning about their more specific beliefs and 
desires. For example, if the recipient of a SSA holds the general assumption that others will act in 
their own best interest (c.f., Miller, 1999) and perceives the consequent of the argument to be 
unambiguously negative, then it can be quickly inferred that the speaker wants to avoid any action 
that might lead to these consequences (Bonnefon, 2009; Thompson et al., 2005).   
The eye movement data presented in Study 3 show that this inference is made quickly and 
spontaneously. Evaluation of an argument requires the recipient to look at the argument from their 
own perspective, but also from the perspective of the speaker (or writer) (Thompson et al., 2005).  
The eye movement data showed that readers readily adopted the speaker’s perspective. Readers found 
the SSA difficult to process when the speaker had no desire to oppose the initial proposal. These data 
suggest that the attitudes of a character constrain expectations about what they will subsequently say 
or do. A context in which the speaker supports the initial proposal ruled out the expectation of a SSA, 
whereas the other two experimental contexts did not rule out this type of argument.  The Consistent 
and Inconsistent conditions built clear expectations about the likely utterances of the speaker. The 
former made it likely that the speaker would argue against a given proposal, while the latter ruled out 
such an expectation. Interestingly, mean Regression Path time to the Neutral condition was 
indistinguishable from that in the Consistent condition, suggesting that the comprehension of a SSA 
may occur with minimal cognitive effort even when context does not constrain expectations. This 
suggests that SSAs may be treated as a form of generalised implicature that can be easily interpreted 
even out of context.  
One of the primary rhetorical functions of a SSA is to convince the recipient that taking a seemingly 
moderate action will raise the probability of an undesirable outcome (and therefore convincing them 
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that the initial action should not be taken).  One consequence is that for a SSA to be effective, the 
subjective conditional probability of (C) given (A) must be greater than the prior probability of (C). 
This is what we found in Study 2. However, despite being statistically significant, this finding must be 
interpreted with some caution. The mean prior probability of the (C) was very low (.18) and although 
the mean probability of (C) given (A) was relatively higher (.25) it was still low in absolute terms. In 
other words, the arguments were effective at slightly increasing the perceived probability of an 
unlikely event, but even then, the probability of the outcome was perceived to be low.  Indeed, when 
participants were asked in Study 4 how persuasive they found the arguments there was no consistent 
evidence that the arguments were perceived to be persuasive at all. Perceived degree of 
persuasiveness did differ as a function of the internal coherence between what the speaker believed 
and what they implied, but even when there was high internal coherence there was no consistent 
agreement that the arguments were persuasive (with the mean response corresponding to ‘Neither 
Agree nor Disagree’).  However, probability and persuasiveness may be irrelevant if individuals who 
assert SSAs are more concerned with asserting their position (i.e., that they oppose an action) than 
they are with convincing others that the argument is actually true. If a SSA is simply used for this 
purpose, then the more extreme the predicted consequence the more rhetorically useful the argument 
should be (regardless of its probability or persuasiveness).  
The limited empirical research on SSAs to date has mainly focused on the mechanism of the Slippery 
Slope. Most notably, Corner et al. (2011) found that the more similar the ends of the slope, the more 
convincing a SSA was perceived to be. Because the focus of this paper is primarily on the rhetorical 
effect of SSAs we did not collect any data on the similarity of the ends of the slope, while Studies 1-3 
only measured the strength of the speaker’s implied message rather than the actual strength of their 
argument. However, our findings do provide a useful insight that should be considered in future 
studies on the mechanism of the slippery slope. In Study 4 we did measure perceived strength of the 
argument (by asking how ‘persuasive’ each argument was) and found that one important contextual 
factor (the speaker’s known beliefs) influences the perceived strength of a SSA. This finding shows 
that to fully understand the mechanism of the SSA researchers must consider the broad social context 
of an argument (such as who is making the argument, why they are making the argument and who the 
recipient is) alongside factors such probability, utility and similarity.   
An important point to consider is whether the findings reported above are unique to SSAs, or whether 
the same findings would be expected from any negative consequential, such as the conditional 
persuasions and dissuasions that have been studied in previous work. Both Bonnefon and Hilton 
(2004) and Thompson et al. (2005) showed that people expect an antecedent action to be avoided 
when its predicted consequences are negative. So far as the studies reported in this paper are 
concerned, it is likely that a similar pattern of results would be found with other types of conditional 
speech act, such as threats and warnings. Conditional threats, warnings and SSAs are all uttered with 
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the intention of discouraging an initial proposal. Indeed, threats, like SSAs often describe severe, but 
unlikely consequences (e.g., “if you touch my stuff, then I’ll kill you”). The important thing is not 
necessarily the likelihood of the consequence being true, but the implied meaning (e.g., don’t touch 
my stuff) (Wray, Wood, Haigh & Stewart, submitted). In this sense, SSAs have much in common 
with threats, warnings and other consequential conditionals with negative consequences.  
The unique contribution of the studies reported above is a) to confirm that SSAs are a form of 
consequential argument resulting in inferences about the speaker’s attitudes to the initial proposal b) 
to show that people spontaneously infer this perspective, and c) to show that the attitudes of the 
speaker influence the perceived coherence, strength and persuasiveness of their argument. These 
findings provide a foundation for future research exploring the situations in which SSAs and other 
types of consequentialist argument can be more or less effective. We have demonstrated that SSAs 
strongly imply opposition to change, but the persuasive effect on the recipient may differ due to 
various individual factors such as the recipients own prior perspective (e.g., whether they already 
agree or disagree with the speaker, or have no prior opinion) and the specific way in which they 
combine the relative costs and benefits of the proposed action and its predicted consequences.  
The four studies presented above indicate that SSAs imply opposition to change. Orthogonal to the 
debate on whether SSAs are logically valid or invalid arguments, our data reveal that they achieve 
their rhetorical purpose. They strongly imply opposition to a possible action and they raise the 
perceived probability of an undesirable outcome. Regardless of their reputation, SSAs are an effective 
rhetorical device that can be asserted with high conversational relevance in situations where the 
speaker’s attitudes permit opposition to the proposed action.  
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